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Tanzania and Uganda: 
Contrasting Similarities 
Daniel G. Zirker 
Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya provide striking institutional comparisons and 
contrasts in both ethno-political dynamics and civil-military relations, al­
though both Tanzania and Uganda, in what were arguably their most forma­
tive periods at least, displayed what Ali Ma.ZJUi described as "the most acute 
manifestation[s] of the crisis of identity," while employing ethno-politics to 
resist the remnants of their colonial dependency. 1 Both manifested forms of 
invented military ethnic identities, or quasi-ethnicities, at one or another 
junctures, although under very different circumstances, and for very different 
purposes. After the infamous 1971 Idi Amin coup, Uganda reverted to 
government by an ethnic, or quasi-ethnic, "Muslim club,"2 the Nubian "mar­
tial race," or "warrior class," that had originally assisted in the establishment 
of the British colony of Uganda, prompting MaZIUi to comment in 1975 that 
"tribalism in Africa is unlikely to disappear within a single lifetime. "3 And 
yet tribalism seems largely to have done precisely this in neighboring Tanza­
nia except, perhaps, for the emergence of religious differences in the 1990s 
as potentially divisive and even catastrophic factors. 
A fundamental tipping point was the unsuccessful East African mutiny in 
Tanganyika in 1964, which triggered the creation of a new military establish­
ment there, framed primarily ideologically, but with an ethnic African lingua 
franca, Kiswahili, a unified mission, national ethnic integration and develop­
ment, and, ultimately, a national outcome, the concretization of an incipient 
quasi-ethnicity within the military. This was subsequently dispersed through­
out the new country of Tanzania to become, with surprising rapidity, the 
national ethnic identity. Tanzania is arguably a case where the invention of a 
military quasi-ethnic identity was quickly and intentionally spread via the 
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military to become the single national identity. The military, in this case, did 
not, and was never intended to achieve a measure of independence or autono­
my through the invention of this quasi-ethnic identity, but rather, was de­
signed to be the vanguard for a wholly new and stable national identity. 4 
The three East African countries thus form a kind of ethno-political con­
tinuum, then, with Uganda and Tanzania occupying opposite ends. Tangan­
yika, Rwanda and Burundi, German East Africa until WWI, had been con­
trolled by German military units heavily staffed with German officers and 
multi-ethnic African soldiers. Uganda evinced a British-directed and Suda­
nese-enlisted military establishment from its earliest colonial period on the 
basis of what Cynthia Enloe has described in wider terms as a "martial 
race,"5 in this case a loose ethnic association of Muslim tribesmen from the 
Sudan, what Mazrui specifically referred to as associated ''Nilotic and Su­
danic Tribesmen,"6 and what subsequent and more careful ethnographic 
studies have characterized as a single, if weakly construed, ethnic, or ethno­
linguistic group, the Nubians, or Nubi. 7 Discussed in greater detail below, 
this was a Sudanic military group of various tribes led southward by British 
Captain Frederick Lugard in the aftermath of the defeat of Charles Gordon in 
Khartoum in the late nineteenth century and represented an attempt to secure 
the key tactical headwaters of the Nile River for the British Empire. 
Tanganyika, the mainland part of today's Tanzania, had clearly benefited 
politically from its multiplicity of ethnic groups, more than 120, in which 
there were no dominant identities, and hence no politically hegemonic 
groups. The largest ethno-linguistic group in Tanzania today, the Sukuma, 
make up about 13 percent of the population, although have never been very 
organized as an interest group. No other group comprises, or has comprised 
in the past, more than five percent of the population, and none of these can be 
said to be political1" or militarily dominant. In fact, Tanganyika has never 
had a dominant ethnic group, and hence, in Ali Mazxui's analysis, was 
"spared the deeply divisive potentialities of ethnic cleavages." Its founding 
national leader, Julius Nyerere, came from a small and insignificant ethnic 
group, the Zanaki. Although he was a captivating speaker with a compelling 
nationalist vision, Mazxui stressed Nyerere's "warmth" as his primary politi­
cal asset, which was said to have "captivated the public. Such personal qual­
ities can be seen to be effective in a society like that of Tanzania, which is 
not particularly divided by ethnic considerations." 8 
In sharp contrast with Tanzania, five ethnic groups in Kenya make up 
nearly three-fourths of the country's population, with the powerful Kikuyu at 
22 percent the dominant political force, and four others-the Luhya, Luo, 
Kalenjin and Kamba-all vying for second place in the 11-14 percent range. 
Although the longest-serving Kenyan president, Daniel arap Moi, is a Kalen­
jin, the other three post-independence presidents have all been Kikuyu, and it 
is this ethnic group that has dominated independent Kenya, often with the use 
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of violent ethno-political means. As is clear in Thomas Stubbs's chapter, 
while the military establishment has experienced careful ethnic "balancing" 
in favor of the dominant groups, it has been largely exempt from internal 
security duties, and thus uninvolved in internal ethnic violence and not in 
need of special bargaining power or autonomy for political or budgetary 
purposes. The politically dominant ethnic identity in the country, either the 
Kikuyu or, during Daniel arap Moi's long term in power, the Kalenjin, typi­
cally dominated top military appointments. 
Uganda is both similar and contrasting in this regard: Although politically 
dominant ethnic minorities of the day have dominated key military appoint­
ments, the military has frequently been used to preserve political dominance, 
has sought and achieved autonomy, and has even ruled the country in support 
of authoritarian leaders during lengthy periods. Nine ethnic groups make up 
two-thirds of Uganda's population, with the largest and historically most 
powerful, the Baganda, organized in the Kingdom of Buganda, at 17.3 per­
cent. The first prime minister and then president of independent Uganda, 
Milton Obote, from the much smaller and less prestigious northern Langi 
group, made a point of dominating the Baganda during his first period of 
executive leadership ( 1962-1971 ), to the point of using his Langi-dominated 
military to attack the Kabaka's (Sir Edward Mutese II, the Buganda king and, 
at the time, the executive president of the country) palace in 1966, driving 
him into exile and rendering that most influential ethnic group organization­
ally incapacitated and effectively subservient. 9 The infamous military dicta­
tor, Idi Amin, who followed Obote's first government after his coup d'etat in 
1971, reversed many of Obote's most demeaning anti-Baganda policies 
while nevertheless preventing a return to power of the Kabaka lO and Bagan­
da dominance. His ethnic targets were initially directed elsewhere, however, 
were frankly ethno-political and numerous beyond reason. Despite accounts 
to the contrary, Milton Obote' s second term as president, 1980-1 986, was in 
effect very similar to Amin's, with drastic ethnic warfare and between 
500,000 and 750,000 deaths, this time with other groups of northerners, 
Acholi (for the very first time) and Langi, elevated to the highest military 
positions. 
Since assuming power in 1986, current president Y oweri Museveni, of 
the second most, though far less numerous, ethnic group, the Banyankole, 11 
has apparently continued this domination of the Baganda via an ethnically 
packed military establishment, although in recent years he has evinced far 
greater ethnic inclusivity. History and tribal connections have always been 
important, however. The Ugandan military prior to 1979 had often been 
staffed by a "martial race," and as Mazrui put it, with "an ethnic division of 
labor ... Baganda for administrators and Nilotes as soldiers." 12 
The "Nilotes," or "Nubians," had been the dominant backbone of the 
colonial military at its formation, and became dominant again under the 
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ruthless dictator, General Idi Amin. They had been fashioned from several 
traditional Sudanic ethnicities in the nineteenth century, and by the early 
twentieth century represented a loose ethnic identity, what some have called 
an "open community," or a "Muslim club," with qualifications including the 
ability to speak Kinubi (the Nubi language), although Kiswahili became the 
lingua jranca of the Ugandan army after independence, 13 and the fulfillment 
of light cultural and religious requirements. 14 They fit to some extent what 
we have called a "quasi-ethnic identity," and this appears to have allowed the 
Nubians to preserve a claim to a special association with the Ugandan mili­
tary for nearly a century, and for that military to have maintained a high 
degree of autonomy between 1971 and 1979 when they were again in charge. 
The use of ethnic "balancing" in the Ugandan military has apparently contin­
ued into the present, although the Nubians lost power, perhaps forever, with 
the defeat of Idi Amin in 1979. 
A central element in the creation of an ethnic identity, and even more so 
in a national identity, is the effective use of a lingua Jranca. As noted above, 
both Kenya and Uganda used English as a national, elite, lingua franca, 15 and 
English, in turn, required formal education. Tanzania, under Julius "Mwali­
mu"16 Nyerere, turned to the newly formed Tanzanian People's Defence 
Force (TPDF) as a vanguard to implant Swahili, or Kiswahili as it is called in 
its own lexicon, as the primary lingua franca, first in the military and then, 
by diffusion, in the new nation. While this formerly casually, if widely, 
spoken coastal (and principally commercial) language became universal in 
Kenya and Uganda as well, it rapidly became the linguafranca in Tanzania 
and, as traditional tribal languages fade, the only language of many Tanza­
nians today. History, the "gentleness of Tanganyika's political culture," 17 
and its multi-ethnic character all helped in this, although Nyerere's concerted 
strategy, policies at1tl will were crucial elements as well. 
While all three East African countries experienced the 1964 tri-country 
military mutiny, Tanzania's experience was the closest to an ideological and 
political putsch, where students and trade unions threatened to join the muti­
neers. Nyerere went into hiding, and the foreign and defence minister, Oscar 
Kambona, negotiated with the mutineers and put down the uprising, much to 
the president's embarrassment. The political response from Nyerere was to 
disestablish the Tanganyikan African Rifles and transform the post-mutiny 
army into a vanguard for the creation of a new national ethnic identity. The 
new Tanzanian military would lead the way. It continued, periodically, to 
threaten intervention, as in 1982, but its primary and original purpose almost 
precluded institutional autonomy, special consideration in an ethno-political 
competition, or an ethno-political alliance. Thanks to the vanguard military 
culture, Tanzania had been largely free of ethno-politics, at least until the 
1990s and the entry of Muslim fundamentalism. The Ugandan military, on 
the other hand, like that of Kenya, was dominated at times by so-called 
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"martial races," and gradually developed a "lumpen militariat," to use Ali 
Maziui's words. 18 
Uganda's Military: Ethno-Politics and Intervention 
The 1964 East African mutiny was easily stopped in Uganda with the help of 
British forces, although Obote's government made few changes in the organ­
ization and offered liberal concessions to the military. Uganda had relatively 
few ethnic groups, four "kingdoms," and thus dominant minorities, as did 
Kenya, although unlike in Kenya, it was burdened with one very small and 
specialized military minority, a "fossilized community," or "anachronism of 
history,'' 19 an amalgam of the relegated "martial races" who traced their 
lineage back to Sudan and considered themselves to be privileged foreigners, 
the Nilotes, or Nubians. In 1971, although well under 5 percent of the popu­
lation, they made up a sizeable percentage of the enlisted ranks, and ultimate­
ly seized power ooder the leadership of a ruthless dictator, transforming, but 
not unifying, the national power structure and ethnic composition of the 
country over a nightmarish seven-year period. 
After the death of Governor-General Charles George Gordon in the Mah­
dist uprising in Khartoum in 1885, fragments of the remaining British coloni­
al military were brought together under Emin Pasha, in effect a "Sudaniza­
tion" of the British colonial military, and by 1891 a new ethnic identity was 
said to have been formed among these various Sudanic tribes, including the 
Kakwa, that constituted it. This "Nubian," or "Nubi" identity, characterized 
by dress (white robes), religion (a distinct brand of Islam) and an accepted 
nationality (Sudanese), was regarded by the British as a kind of martial race, 
a "semi-civilized" fighting force that was moved southward in 1892 for 
tactical reasons ooder the command of Captain Frederick Lugard. Their goal 
was the strategic Nile headwaters region and what is today Uganda. This 
group became emblematic of Ugandan military culture, and later captured 
independent Uganda, the "Pearl of Africa," under the dictatorship of Nubian/ 
Kakwa Idi Amin Dada. 
The Nubians were, in a sense, a forerunner of the very tentative and 
incipient military quasi-ethnicities that seem to be emerging in some coun­
tries today, although they predated even the colony of Uganda by becoming 
the foot soldiers of its pre-colonial structure. Regarded from the first as an 
invented ethnicity, an open community, or even a "Muslim club" that could 
be easily joined, and was laden with ethnic ambiguity,20 the Nubians re­
garded their move to the South over the next century as a "deliberate invita­
tion from the colonial authorities," one that came with an ongoing debt owed 
to them of privileges. Lugard had, in fact, signed an agreement in which nine 
hundred soldiers and nine thousand dependents were enrolled under his com­
mand in a "guided migration."21 When they reached what is today Uganda, 
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they were organized into garrisons and spread throughout the territory. This 
"semi-civilized" group subsequently proceeded to enter into a wide variety of 
political alliances, including one with dissatisfied Muslims in Buganda, en­
gaged in various political machinations, including several failed mutinies 
against British rule, and, ultimately, were re-pacified and incorporated by 
1 901 into a formal military unit, the King's African Rifles. By 1 908, Nubians 
were said to comprise 595 of the 774 soldiers in the Ugandan contingent of 
that military force. 22 
The Nubians would continue to resist classification as a "tribe," in part 
because they were in no way agrarian, and failed to resemble a "tribe" in 
other respects. "Tribes" in the Ugandan context were associated with home­
lands and relegated primarily to a subsistence farming, or peasant, existence. 
Aside from their primary role as soldiers, the Nubians saw themselves as a 
loose collection of Sudanese, as temporary immigrants in Uganda with spe­
cial privileges and, if forced out of these roles, as traders, merchants and 
petty bureaucrats. They had no background in agriculture, and no desire or 
ability to become peasants. Nevertheless, over the next thirty years the colo­
nial authorities attempted, mostly with little success, and through various 
unsuccessful plans, to award the Nubians land (a "homeland"), to regularize 
them as an agrarian Ugandan tribe and to break their ties with Sudan. They 
tended not to consult the Nubians regarding most of these plans, however, 
and the plans were typically ignored when (and it) they came to light. 
After WWI, and military demobilization, most of the Nubians retired 
from military service and returned to their dependents. Their primary com­
munity, or mulki, in Uganda had been established in Buganda in the town of 
Bombo, just north of Kampala. Most of them settled into a relatively impov­
erished urban existence there as petty traders, unskilled workers and minor 
bureaucrats, still reKant on diminishing military salaries and pensions. When 
they were finally asked for their input into yet another new and comprehen­
sive "tribalization" plan by then-Governor-General Sir Philip Mitchell in 
1 936, they responded with a series of their own demands. They reminded 
him of past promises based upon their "valiant" military service, of their 
desire to remain in Bombo, but not under the administration of the Kingdom 
of Buganda ( as others in that region were), and of their continuing insistence 
that they were a military reserve force. They argued that they remained, and 
should remain, a privileged immigrant community (and demanded to be 
treated as such), that the land deal that he was proposing was simply not 
acceptable, 21 and that, in the absence of a mutually acceptable alternative, the 
colonial authorities were obliged at the very least to maintain the status quo. 
The Ugandan colonial authorities responded by marginalizing the Nu­
bians in the next ( 1 938) plan. While privileges of ex-servicemen were guar­
anteed for life, and existing individual land titles were honored, no other 
categories of Nubians were recognized, and the privileged immigrant status 
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that they had insisted upon over the previous fifty years was now formally 
denied. 24 The immigration of South Asian merchants and traders was now 
facilitated, cutting off the only, albeit feeble, source of upward mobility for 
the Nubians, and they were said to have rapidly become "an introverted, 
almost fossilized community," and "an anachronism of history."25 When, in 
the 1959 census (just three years before independence), they had disappeared 
as a separate category, the assumption was incorrectly made that they had 
been absorbed by the other ethnic groups in Uganda. They were certainly no 
longer apparent as a recognized indigenous ethnic group. This gave them no 
protection in President Milton Obote's 1967 coup; moreover, when he ex­
pelled the Kenyan Luos as illegal immigrants, the Nubians ' apparent contin­
uing insistence that they were Sudanese immigrants, "privileged" or not, 
recognized as an independent group or not, rendered them vulnerable to the 
xenophobia that was rife at this difficult moment, and thus to deportation. 
Their soon-to-emerge leader, Idi Amin, would take this lesson to heart five 
years later in his deportation of the Ugandan Asians. 
Milton Obote, the prime minister ( 1 962-I 966) and then president 
(1966-1971 ; 1980-1985) of Uganda, like his friend Julius Nyerere of Tanza­
nia, was obsessed with the prospect of a military coup. 26 The Obote regime 
had packed the military, and particularly the officer corps, with northerners 
from his marginalized home tribe, the Langi, as well as with largely incom­
patible Acholi and Nubians, also northerners, replacing the Bagandan offi­
cers that the later colonial authorities had favored. Initially supporting the 
Kabaka (king) of Buganda, Sir Edward Mutese, in the largely ceremonial 
role as executive president of the country, he soon broke with him when the 
Kabaka refused to sign documents alienating some of the Buganda King­
dom's lands,27 and, as noted above, attacked his royal palace and drove him 
into exile, assuming the presidency for himself. Obote ' s  declining party sup­
port and accusations of corruption shook his faith in the dominance of the 
intelligentsia and the viability of institutionalized ethnic pluralism in Ugan­
da. His coup d 'etat of 1966, after which he was said to have maintained 
marginal freedom of the press and some degree of other basic human 
rights, 2s helped military politics to spin out of control with what Ali Mazrui 
called the emergence of a "lumpen militariat" and, somewhat inaccurately, a 
"military-agrarian complex."29 
At this point, educated Langi and Acholi officers were gradually assum­
ing some military command positions in what Mazrui characterized as a 
loose coalition between the intelligentsia and the military high command. 30 
Their linguafranca was English, 3 1 and their collective culture was decidedly 
neo-colonial. Senior Nubian officers in command positions were wary, how­
ever, as they were increasingly shunted into potentially less threatening posi­
tions, and although the military had formalized Kiswahili as its linguafran­
ca, and a Nubian officer from Bombo, General Idi Amin Dada, had been 
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promoted to commander of the army, it was clear that a narrowing, what 
Donald Horowitz referred to as an "attritional process," was now in play. A 
December 1 969 assassination attempt on Obote apparently initiated a chain 
of events that led to military intervention by Amin. 32 
Idi Amin is regarded by many observers as the most infamous of African 
dictators, responsible for the murders of perhaps as many as half a million 
people. The exact numbers are contested. What is not contested, however, is 
that Idi Amin engaged in wholesale murder, and this was immediately appar­
ent in the army, where he almost straightaway purged non-Northern officers, 
and then proceeded to kill perhaps five thousand northern Acholi and Langi 
soldiers, followed by non-West Nilers, then by non-Muslim Nubians, 33 even­
tually creating a loyal cohort that included Muslim Kakwa (his Nubian tribe), 
Muslim Nubians, imported southern Sudanese, and even a special presiden­
tial guard of four hundred Palestinians, what Tony Avirgan and Martha Hon­
ey called a "non-national mercenary force." 34 In 1 972 he -deported eighty 
thousand South Asians and a few Europeans to Britain, Canada, India and a 
variety of other countries . They were mostly traders and commercial fami­
lies, and this opened wide economic opportunities for Nubians and other 
Amin supporters. Nubians became the vital, indeed, the only source of eco­
nomic opportunities for Ugandans, and their open ethnic boundaries meant 
that they experienced a halcyon era of patronage, recrui1ment and well-be­
ing. 35 
Nubians, then, celebrated their return to privilege and prominence in 
Uganda. The military quickly adopted, or re-adopted, a largely Nubian ethnic 
identity, with dictator Idi Amin's  blessing and encouragement. As he en­
gaged in progressively intensive ethnic "attrition," their ethnic competitors 
were removed in civil society. 36 Eventually, a tiny percentage of the popula­
tion was put in chaFge of the military, the economy and the political system, 
and the concept of "top-heaviness" increasingly came to apply. As his num­
ber of ethnically based supporters and followers was continually winnowed 
and reduced, the stability of his regime decreased. In 1 979 a series of high 
profile assassinations and assassination attempts against prominent Bagan­
dans and other non-Nubians pushed the Amin regime to the brink of collapse, 
and the dictator lashed out at Tanzania, probably in part as a diversionary 
tactic. He suddenly annexed the Tanzanian Kagera District (in northeast 
Tanzania), and President Julius Nyerere, a close friend of Obote, was only 
too happy to mobilize the Tanzania People 's  Defence Force, along with 
groups of disaffected Ugandans in exile funded by a wide range of sources 
and countries, 37 to strike back. 
After years of purges, ethnic "attrition" and regime narrowing, Amin's  
political and mil itary base was so  narrow that i t  collapsed quickly and virtu­
ally disappeared in several weeks of limited warfare in 1 979. Obote was soon 
reinstated following a snap election, although as A virgan and Honey note in 
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the postscript to their 1982 book, his reinstatement did not restore order to 
the country. Key anti-Amin fighters, including formerly exiled guerrilla 
Yoweri Museveni, went into the bush in 1980 after the election to continue 
their war against the "old order," with which they included Milton Obote. 38 
Obote, perhaps predictably, quickly moved to control the ethnic composition 
of the Ugandan army, establishing a new organization, the Uganda National 
Liberation Army, placing Langi and Acholi officers in major military posi­
tions, 39 and otherwise failing to take an analytical and self-critical view of 
the new, post-Amin Uganda. 
Obote's first major challenges came from other northern tribes. In the 
face of low legitimacy and recent loss of status, these went into open rernlt. 
Museveni's National Resistance Movement (NRM), based on western tribes, 
including his own Banyankole, was also making major tactical gains. In 1 983 
Obote launched Operation Bonanza, a major military offensive that included 
moving northern populations into controlled villages. It is said to have cost 
hundreds of thousands of lives, and his own carefully winnowed military 
establishment ultimately revolted. Two of Obote's hand-picked Acholi gen­
erals overthrew him in 1985 after what had perhaps been five hundred thou­
sand deaths in Obote's military operations. 40 They in tum were overthrown 
the next year by Museveni's NRM. Obote's bloody legacy was comparable 
to Amin's in the end, and for similar reasons, although this is rarely recalled 
as such. 
Museveni pledged from the first to enact fundamental change, including 
ethnic power sharing, to include top command positions in the newly re­
named National Resistance Army (NRA), which was now the Ugandan mili­
tary. Nevertheless, from the first the NRA was said to have a strong ethnic 
bias for officers from the west and central Uganda, and from Museveni's 
ethnic group. the Banyankole, and from one of the four traditional Ugandan 
kingdoms, the Ankole Kingdom in southwestern Uganda. He also formed 
alliances with other westerners--the Bakiga, the Banyoro and the Batoro­
and, secondly, with the Baganda. 41 Westerners became entrenched at the top 
of the officer corps, occupying over 60 percent of the top positions, with 44 
percent of those positions going to members of Museveni's own Banyankole 
group, although junior officers were more evenly distributed. 42 The most 
marginalized group was the formerly prominent Acholi, although northerners 
were mostly excluded from major civilian and military power positions. 43 
Stefan Lindemann identifies ethnic exclusion as the single factor, indeed 
the primary cause, of the seven major civil wars that Museveni confronted 
between 1986 and 2011, when Lindemann's study was completed.44 Al­
though there have been far fewer outbreaks of civil unrest in the past four 
years, and Museveni has maintained a pattern of broadening ethnic participa­
tion in Uganda, by most accounts the Uganda People's Defence Force 
(UPDF), renamed as such in 1995, remains ethnically balanced and exclu-
62 Daniel G. Zirker 
sionary. The closeness of the Banyankole and the Rwandan Tutsi, and the 
participation of Rwandan Tutsi exiles, including Paul Kagame, in Museve­
ni's National Resistance Movement and later in the NRA, largely explain 
Museveni's significant support of the overthrow of the Rwandan Hutu re­
gime in 1994 and his support of Kagame's Rwandan government initiatives 
thereafter. The forging of these inter-ethnic and international ties have given 
the Ugandan military a particular identity. One can only speculate as to how 
this independent identity may ultimately proceed in stabilizing a perennially 
WlStable situation. 
Tanzania: A Quasi-Ethnic Vanguard Anny 
The 1 964 East African mutiny had a particularly profmmd effect on Tangan­
yika. As a German colony after the Berlin Conference of 1 884-1 885, it had 
been a locus of inter-ethnic violence, forced agricultural production for ex­
port, and a major popular rebellion in which as many as a hundred thousand 
people had died between 1 905 and 1 907. With Germany's  defeat in WWI, 
Tanganyika became a British protectorate, although the divide-and-rule and 
forced agricultural production-for-export policies continued. The islands of 
Zanzibar and Pemba, just off the coast of Tanganyika, and part of the Omani 
Empire in the 1 700s and 1800s, fell under British domination in the late 
nineteenth century and remained protectorates well into the twentieth. In 
1961 and 1 963, respectively, Tanganyika and Zanzibar received their inde­
pendence. Tanganyika became a republic in 1962, and Zanzibar, goaded into 
an outburst of anti-Arab hatred by a Tanganyikan mainlander, John Okello, 
in late 1 963 , had a brief, violent revolution and killed or drove into exile its 
remaining Arab population. 
The January 1964 mutiny, which affected all three East African countries, 
was thought to have originated in Tanganyika over a pay dispute, and re­
mained a minor pay dispute in Uganda and Kenya, although it seems to have 
been primarily a rejection in Tanganyika of the Africanization of the officer 
corps. 45 It appeared in this sense to represent an incipient solidarity, a class­
like behavior among enlisted men who had placed their immediate interests 
in a wider social context, constituting themselves perhaps in what Ali Mazrui 
would call a "lumpen militariat. "46 Henry Bienen noted that the mutiny in 
Tanganyika was "intimately related to the Zanzibar Revolution and devel­
oped with such suddenness and surprise that it seemed at first to be not 
indigenous to Tanganyika's political system."47 The embarrassment that 
Nyerere sufferered, disappearing into hiding and relying upon Foreign and 
Defence Minister Kambona to settle the crisis, who in turn called most em­
barrassingly upon British troops to back up his talks, led to a formal presi­
dential apology48 and a consequent insistence on fimdamental change. Nye­
rere made it clear that from that point on that he would undertake fundamen-
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ta! change in the military and that the task would be a challenging one that 
would nevertheless be undertaken energetically. As he put it in his apology, 
"It is not easy to disarm an army, especially one that is already intoxicated 
with the poison of disloyalty and disobedience. "49 
The dismissal of the entire Tanganyikan military was followed somewhat 
dramatically by the national merger of Zanzibar and Tanganyika, the renam­
ing oCthis new confederal system in April of that same year, and the com­
plete restaffmg and reorganization of the newly dubbed Tanzanian People's 
Defence Force (TPDF) in September. All officers and enlisted men were 
required to have been party cadres in one of the two (now semi-merged) 
official "single parties"-Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) or 
the Zanzibari Afro-Shirazi Party. Party commissars were given formal mili­
tary appointments, as were liaison representatives. As in Uganda, Kiswahili 
first became the official military language, but in this case, unlike in Uganda, 
this was part of a strategy for it to become the primary, and really the only 
national language as well. 50 
There is little doubt that Nyerere had intended to use Kiswahili as one of 
the keys to assist in binding Tanganyika, and then Tanzania, into a single 
ethnicity, a single national identity. He was greatly aided in this by the 
multiplicity of small and relatively weak traditional ethnic groups in Tangan­
yika. There were simply no dominant groups to threaten this policy with their 
tribal languages, as had been the case in Kenya and Uganda. Moreover, the 
post-colonial military did not have a "martial race," although there had been 
warlike tribes, the Hehe and the Kuria. 5 1  With the complete reestablishment 
of the army as the TPDF, a strict formula for ethnic quotas was combined 
with the elimination from the senior ranks of those groups that had a procliv­
ity for military adventurism. 52 
Nyerere had stressed Kiswahili as a natural cultural unifier after his return 
to Tanganyika in the early 1 950s from his studies in Scotland. 53 It was 
already widely, if very inaccurately, spoken as a commercial language, had 
been identified by the German colonizers prior to WWI as a useful adminis­
trative language, and had already been rendered into Latin script with Kiswa­
hili-English and Kiswahili-German dictionaries. 54 Nyerere soon translated a 
number of classics from English into Kiswahili, including, perhaps signifi­
cantly, Shakespeare's Julius Caesar, an account, significantly, of an ancient 
and failed coup d 'etat, and the Merchant of Venice, said to have obliquely 
characterized the South Asian merchants in Tanganyika, a large, relatively 
wealthy and potentially ethnically destabilizing force, as the Jews of Venice. 
Was the former, as Ali Mazrui would later ask, related to Julius Nyerere's 
later introduction of the "Preventive Detention Act in order to forestall a 
possible assassination of an African Julius?"55 Was the latter Nyerere's pre­
scient anticipation of dictator Idi Amin's expulsion of the Ugandan South 
Asians in I 972 and his own social isolation of them in Tanzania? 
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K.iswahili became the language of primary and secondary education, and 
is listed today as the first official national language, with English as the 
second. This ordering of Tanzania's official languages was not a small mat­
ter. Both Kenya and Uganda, where Kiswahili is also widely, and even 
universally, spoken, list English as the first official language, with Kiswahili 
second. Kiswahili is indisputably the primary language in Tanzania and is 
widely supported as such. The Institute of Kiswahili Studies at the University 
of Dar es Salaam became a central focal point of this policy . Nevertheless, it 
was the TPDF that pioneered this policy, that created this new ethnic iden­
tity, and that added to linguistic unity a focus upon national loyalty, commit­
ment to nation-building projects (i.e . ,  Ujamaa), education and technical com­
petency, each of which became bywords of the socio-economic revolution 
that Nyerere hoped to spread via the TPDF. 
The creation of a formal and multifaceted Tanzanian military mission 
abroad became an important conditioning agent in the establishment of a 
vanguard military quasi-ethnicity. This militarization of Tanzanian foreign 
policy directly involved the TPDF, and belied a fundamental ambiguity in 
national outlook, what Ali Mazrui referred to as "the marked distrust of men 
under arms at home combined with a faith in military or quasi-military solu­
tions to some of the remaining colonial problems in Africa."56 The TPDF 
was said to have participated in military struggles abroad, including reported­
ly assisting FRELIMO (the Mozambique Liberation Front) in its war against 
Portugal for the independence of Mozambique. 57 Nevertheless, the TPDF 
remained only marginally militarized, while civil society took a greater than 
perhaps expected military lesson from this vanguard organization. It was 
what one of my colleagues in the Department of Political Science and Public 
Administration at the University of Dar es Salaam in 1 990 called the simulta­
neous "politicizatiott of the military and the militarization of civil society."  
I t  should not be surprising, in  this context, that the TPDF's response to  Idi 
Amin's annexation of Kagera District in 1979 was said "not [to be] disci­
plined and professional. " 58 It was, after all, primarily a move to overthrow 
Amin, rather than to repulse a foreign invasion, and hence it represented the 
use of the military as an instrument in national ( and partisan) political policy. 
It was dramatic in that regard, for as Newsweek Magazine reported, it was 
"the first time in Africa's post-colonial history that one country has success­
fully invaded another, occupied its capital and overthrown its ruler."59 More­
over, it transformed the cultural identity of the TPDF, and soon thereafter of 
wider Tanzanian society: The experience of very poor soldiers who were 
suddenly exposed to looting, and voluntary and coerced sexual relations 
(rape), followed by rapid demobilization, had an immediate impact. A peace­
ful society, Tanzania, was soon exposed to violent robberies and other inci­
dents of violent crime perpetrated by returned servicemen. The military itself 
was said to have engaged in acts of revenge-taking against the Bagandans 
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during occupation, 60 and after the war, police in Tanzania discovered that 
they were arresting frequently armed demobilized militiamen for 60 percent 
of the thefts and violent crimes in Dar es Salaam. 61 Nevertheless, that van­
guard quasi-ethnic identity that had been injected into the TPDF at its origins 
in 1 964 had "taken," had been disseminated. Tanzania was now a single 
ethnic entity in most respects. In 1 990, several Somali poachers were arrested 
at the Dar es Salaam airport with forged Tanzanian passports. I remember 
colleagues chuckling at their plight: They claimed to be Tanzanians, but 
could not speak Kiswahili l They were not . . . Tanzanians! 
CONCLUSION 
With the advent of multiparty democracy in Tanzania in the mid-1990s, the 
rapid growth of neo-liberalism and European capital investment, and the 
arrival of Muslim fundamentalism after the first U .S. Gulf War in 1 99 1 ,  
Tanzania has experienced dramatic tensions and heterogeneous forces that 
threaten to undermine its national ethnic identity. Fonnerly peaceful inter­
religious relations were shattered in the early 1 990s with school burnings and 
in the late 1990s with the bombing of the U .S. Embassy in Dar es Salaam. 
Somali attacks in Kenya in 2015 have led to panics at the University of Dar 
es Salaam following the appearance there of a Somali student. Growing 
Muslim-Christian mistrust is said to be problematic. All of this points to the 
fragility of transforming national identities, but even more to the concept of 
quasi-ethnicity. The TPDF remains solidly Tanzanian in the sense that its 
quasi-ethnic identity is firm, even if it does not bring with it the benefit of 
institutional autonomy and bargaining power that would pertain in an ethno­
political setting. Museveni's Uganda, on the other hand, has had to establish 
an increasingly accommodating social order, and a more widely inclusive 
power base, and this implies that his military establishment may ultimately 
follow this same pattern. The development of an independent quasi-ethnic 
military identity, in this case, will bring with it both advantages and disad­
vantages to a new nation seeking stability after a century of flux. 
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